The Uses and Abuses of Academic Freedom

The ability to express unpopular views and to test those views through research and scholarship, without fear of sanction, is the essence of academic freedom. It supports the vital role of universities in closed, authoritarian or oppressive societies as the bulwark of free discourse. It is also a key protection to the development of difficult and challenging ideas. In free societies academic freedom acts as a counterbalance against subtle political or economic pressure that can be exerted against universities acting as hosts to thinking or work that runs counter to established interests. As universities become ever more dependent upon industry, government (domestic and foreign), and subject to external scrutiny, the assertion of academic freedom becomes more critical. Academic freedom is a compact among academics for mutual protection where expression is threatened. So far, I guess, so uncontroversial.

What academic freedom is not, is freedom from criticism or critical scrutiny. Particularly, though not exclusively, from colleagues. It is also, and here we start to tread on dangerous ground, not a protection for work that does not meet the appropriate standards of scholarship. Academic life is a privilege and the matching obligation is scholarly rigour. The more radical and disruptive the idea, the higher the bar is set. Thus, for instance, an academic could choose to promulgate work in support of, say, homeopathy. They would be free of active sanction providing their work exhibited the highest degree of experimental rigour and careful analysis. In this case of course, the bar is enormously (I would suggest insurmountably) high because homeopathy (a ridiculous and discredited approach to medical treatment of no value other than as a placebo) requires a complete suspension of belief in basic physical principles. It is thus highly unlikely that the academic in question could call on the protection of academic freedom. Who determines where the bar is set in a particular case? Ultimately this is a matter of peer judgment. Yes, there are risks that this judgment might be biased, but if independent critical judgment is suspended then the whole edifice of research and scholarship collapses in any event.

Let us consider another case, work undertaken in support of a reprehensible ideology such as, for instance, racism. Here we need to draw a difficult line between work, conducted honestly and scrupulously, that provides inadvertent support for such an ideology, and work conducted explicitly in its service. Again, the principle stated above applies: the more extreme the contention, the greater the obligation on the proponent to undertake work that can sustain critical examination. Obviously, freedom to express these ideas does not extend to behaviour that could damage the educational and scholarly community, that is, for example, racist or discriminatory behaviour. Those who espouse a racist ideology could reasonably expect that their actions will be carefully watched. Ultimately somebody advancing racist ideas should also expect their work to be subject to vigorous criticism. They should be asked by colleagues to justify their work and challenged on ethical, moral and political grounds. It is however, possible to call on academic freedom in this situation and, unpleasant though we may find it, racists are entitled to protection from direct sanction. Where the decision to work on this topic is freely taken and deliberate however, those undertaking it cannot be expected wholly to evade the consequences. Their presence will be uncongenial to colleagues and students and it seems unlikely that such work would attract collective resources or be continued where an opportunity on the part of the university to choose a direction is, in the normal course of events, afforded.

Perhaps the most complex cases are academic work which is simply 'unfashionable'. Typically such work would be difficult to publish in prestigious venues or to attract competitive funding. It is very difficult, at the margins, then to distinguish work which is unfashionable from work which is simply poor - the observable consequences are the same. There is clearly no academic freedom protection for sub-standard work. There is a need too to distinguish between those who persist in a line of work because they believe in its importance and potential, irrespective of prevailing opinions, and those who persist for fear of their ability to change direction and are consequently stuck in a rut. It should be said that in many cases though an area of work is temporarily unfashionable it makes strategic sense for a large unit to maintain a capability because research can change quickly and apparent backwaters may turn out to be critical. There are many examples of this, in for instance energy research, that justify such an approach. Here I would contend that academic freedom is not pertinent. There is no freedom to pursue a line of research simply because the academic in question wants to. There must be a good reason and the reasons will need to be clearly articulated. It is a matter of judgment whether these reasons are sound and sufficient. This is a judgment that academic peers are equipped and entitled to reach.

It seems to me that academic freedom in free societies is at least as much threatened by those who would claim it in support of dubious causes as by external pressures. The situations described above with all their complexities and the tight relations between them constitute important challenges that we will have to meet if we are to retain academic freedom as an effective protection where it is truly needed.