The 'Serious Doctrine'

realism and the limits of asymmetry

It is a great misfortune that we have the opportunity to observe the evolution of military strategy through the lens of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. These conflicts remain to ‘play out’, if this is the correct term, but we can at least form some preliminary assessment of the implications for defence technology and innovation.

First and foremost, the ‘3rd offset strategy’ is an operational reality. For those without an immersion in the arcane terminology of this area, an ‘offset strategy’ is a military doctrine that emphasises securing an asymmetric advantage through innovation and technological advance. This is by contrast to symmetric force build-up aiming, essentially to straightforwardly overpower an adversary. Whilst the UK does not use the term ‘offset’ in this context, it has a broadly similar strategic framing.

The 3rd offset, essentially a decade old, has focussed on AI, autonomous systems, cyber and data advantage. These are now key components of warfare and, it appears can be effectively deployed by sub-, or at least near-, peer adversaries. Thus, whilst the 3rd offset foresaw, and conceivably drove the direction of travel, it has not proved possible to sustain a significant asymmetric edge (despite tactical advantages).

A ‘4th offset’ has been much discussed. Choose your emerging technology … quantum, neural enhancement, bioengineering, digital twins, and so on. I do not doubt that these will play a role in shaping future defence, and would invest accordingly, but for the same reason that the 3rd offset did not deliver a sustainable advantage, I do not expect the 4th offset to do so either.

The reason why is that, for the most part, these technologies are varied, build on widely diffused digital platform technologies, and have broad commercial applications. Thus, whilst some steps can be taken to prevent proliferation, there is not much that can prevent an industrially capable state from reproducing them. Opinions differ, but even in the ‘edge case’ of advanced semiconductors, with strong control of limited supply chains, the US has succeeded in only holding China, a key strategic adversary, one generation behind the leading edge.

It is for this reason I tentatively advance the ‘Serious Doctrine’.

The Serious Doctrine is founded upon a few basic tenets. First, that the advantage of the UK, US and its allies is founded upon its democracy, freedom and the rule of law. These are precious assets in a contest of values and ideologies. Further, our commitment to a rules-based international order - recognisably in need of some reconstruction - is a source, ultimately, of strength. In the grey zone between politics and (para-)military action, we have, contrary to established thinking, a strategic advantage, if we choose to use it.

We must equip ourselves to act in this zone. This is in large part institutional - the capacity to act in a coordinated manner across civil and military domains - fusion - and, of course, political. We must build a capacity, on the basis of consent, for a ‘whole of state approach’ that outperforms our adversaries who are able to compel all, including private actors, to align.

The Serious Doctrine is also deeply technical, involving our intelligence capabilities, cyber capacity, the ability to identify and counter mis- and dis-information, sophisticated behavioural analytics, and so on. Along the way these capabilities are valuable tools in counter-insurgency, counter-proxy and counter-terrorism.

We can exploit, by way of these capabilities, an advantage in ‘knowing our enemy’: our ability to make a frank, realistic appraisal of adversary capabilities in comparison with our own. This without the distorting effect, evident in autocratic systems (and demonstrated in the case of both Russia and China) of telling leaders what they wish to hear. We may, by these means, be more able to focus effort where it really counts.

Ultimately, we may be compelled to straight-out fight. Whilst I am sceptical that a 4th offset will deliver a long term advantage, we should ensure we take what advantage we can get, tactically, from our remaining sources of scientific and technological leadership. Where we judge it to be effective, we should make it costly for our adversaries to keep up, without damaging our own long-term economic interests. This rests upon the sort of fusion that is a cornerstone of the Serious Doctrine.

Taking the 3rd offset for granted, and learning the lessons from recent conflicts, we must rely upon the 2nd offset, that is precision and stealth (and battlespace command and control). Whilst adversaries do have significant capabilities, we retain an edge and, with due attention paid to supply chains and maintaining the sovereign skills base, might continue to do so.

The Serious Doctrine places emphasis on the need to achieve coordinated effect across the full range of our capabilities differing in sophistication, scale and their placement on the strategic-tactical spectrum. This is orchestration - beyond battlespace command and control - that is necessarily real-time and substantially autonomous. It is intelligence informed through comprehensive surveillance and operating in all domains, including space. The orchestration is vertically integrated from warfighter through logistics to production. The Serious Doctrine aims for our offsets to be multiplicative rather than incremental.

In the final analysis, we cannot rely too heavily on asymmetric advantage, and the Serious Doctrine requires that we maintain the collective capacity to fight at a peer level.

The Serious Doctrine aligns substantially with the UK 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and National Security Strategy (NSS), particularly in its emphasis on technology within a system-wide strategy. Whilst the SDR and NSS rightly prioritise emerging technologies, the Serious Doctrine contends that enduring advantage lies not in innovation alone but in the integration and orchestration of capabilities across domains. It calls for a practical architecture of civil–military fusion: operational institutions, shared data infrastructures, and coordinated action. This is consistent with the aspiration for a ‘whole-of-society’ approach, but contends that it must be grounded in systems rather than tag-lines.

All three frameworks are values-centred. The Serious Doctrine however, differs in treating democratic values as active strategic assets. It argues that transparency and truth-telling, though often politically uncomfortable, are sources of strength. Our adversaries may be technologically capable, but they are hindered by internal opacity and distorted decision-making. Overall, the Serious Doctrine may be more cautious than the SDR and NSS, but it represents an effort towards a more disciplined realism.

There are no easy answers, only narrow margins held at risk.

(Thanks to a friend who provided valued critical suggestions)