Technology & Sovereignty

… 10 strategic actions

TL;DR Technological sovereignty is not about self-sufficiency or national champions. It is about building resilience and sustaining control and freedom of action in contested technological systems. That, in turn, depends on systems thinking and a coordinated set of strategic actions.

I intend to set out a ‘realistic’ strategy for technological sovereignty for the UK, that can underpin our science and technology policy choices. Too much of the political and policy discourse has, I feel, over-simplified, the challenges we face, and assumed that some combination of on-shoring, regulation, economic protection, the creation of restricted trading blocs, and the sponsorship of ‘national champions’ can achieve our goals. I am disinclined to believe this is the case.

If you have read other articles in this ‘strand’ of @profserious you may observe that technological (tech) sovereignty, understood through the lens of ‘systems resilience’, has formed a connecting theme in my analysis and I hope to bring it together here. It helps to give this currency that the Prime Minister of Canada in his recent, and much-praised, speech at Davos has, albeit from a different perspective, raised similar issues of sovereignty.

Tech sovereignty is the capacity of a state to reliably access, control, adapt, and sustain the technologies on which its national security, prosperity, and public services depend, without unacceptable dependence on actors whose interests it cannot trust or influence. It is tied to the capacity to ensure the secure operation of these technologies, to establish the values that condition their operation, and ultimately to maintain democratic control over their use.

In an uncertain geopolitical environment when some of our key trading partners are untrusted, and even the behaviour of key allies has become increasingly shaped by national interest and economic dominance, and with societal dependence on technology increasing, tech sovereignty is of ever greater importance. Sanctions, export controls, and supply-chain weaponisation are an established feature of a highly contested domain.

Clearly, whilst our principal focus must be on states, as the primary locus of threats to our sovereign interests, we must also consider corporations and platforms (notably, but not exclusively, digital), some of which have established market positions that in themselves constitute a challenge to tech sovereignty. The motivations may be different, but the consequences are similar. The state and corporate interests are often tied together, in some cases difficult to distinguish.

Tech sovereignty has too often been narrowly framed in terms of the capacity to acquire a technology however, the ability to assure and operate the technology is also critical. This rests on skills, and critically on know-how. A tech sovereignty strategy that ignores this is incomplete.

Before considering the strategic actions we can take it is important to emphasise that the technologies we are considering are, almost without exception, complex systems comprising assemblages of component technologies. They are commonly bound into larger systems-of-systems through supply-chains and sophisticated manufacturing capabilities. Once acquired they serve themselves as part of complex operational systems. This more than simply saying ‘it is all very difficult and complicated’ but rather to say that both the challenges of tech sovereignty, and the potential opportunities to address them, rest upon understanding and confronting this ‘systemic essence’.

In @profserious style, here are the 10 key actions.

Establish national resilience maps for critical technologies: The UK should maintain authoritative ‘resilience maps’ for the technologies that underpin national security, economic stability, and essential public services. These should identify critical functions, system interdependencies, single points of failure, and credible disruption scenarios. This provides the evidential basis for prioritisation, investment, and intervention.

Institutionalise supply-chain and scientific intelligence: The UK should treat supply-chain visibility and scientific intelligence as core national security capabilities. This requires sustained, integrated insight into global technology supply chains, emerging technical trajectories, and the strategic intent of state and non-state actors. Intelligence must inform policy, which entails a different kind of analytical capability from that we currently possess.

Actively engineer diversification: The UK should reduce systemic vulnerability by actively engineering diversification across suppliers, technologies, jurisdictions, and delivery models. This is not a market outcome that can be assumed, but rather a strategic objective that has to be shaped through procurement and regulation.

Use standards as a strategic lever: The UK should treat international technical standards as instruments of national power. Influence over standards shapes markets, constrains adversaries, and embeds values at scale. Sustained engagement in standards bodies should be actively prioritised and joined to diplomacy, trade, and regulation.

Secure architectural control of critical systems: The UK should prioritise control over system architectures rather than ownership of all components. Sovereignty is enhanced where interfaces, integration points, and system design allow components to be substituted, assured, or isolated. Architectural control provides for freedom of action when under duress.

Sustain sovereign skills and operational know-how: The UK should ensure enduring domestic capability to acquire, operate, assure, adapt, and recover critical technologies. This extends beyond formal skills to tacit operational knowledge gained through sustained practice. Without this, technological control can scarcely be achieved and degrades rapidly, regardless of where systems are sourced.

Preserve optionality and strategic agility: The UK should design technology policy, procurement, and regulation to preserve optionality. Systems should be modular, contracts flexible, and policies capable of rapid adjustment in response to shocks, sanctions, or technological change. Strategic agility is itself a sovereign capability.

Shape networks of managed interdependence: The UK should seek to embed itself in dense, reciprocal networks of technological and economic interdependence with trusted partners. The objective is not independence, but the avoidance of asymmetric dependence. Properly structured mutual dependence strengthens deterrence and resilience.

Define a narrow, enforceable scope of sovereignty: The UK should explicitly define a narrow set of technologies and capabilities where loss of control would present unacceptable national security risk. Sovereignty efforts should be concentrated here, with clarity and discipline. Elsewhere, managed dependence should be recognised as a rational and necessary choice.

Align the investment ecosystem with security priorities: The UK should align its investment ecosystem with national security objectives, ensuring that strategically critical technologies can be developed, scaled, and sustained domestically or with trusted partners. This includes patient capital, credible procurement pathways, and regulatory certainty. Without this alignment, sovereignty ambitions will not endure.

None of this is ‘heroic’ though it is challenging. Tech sovereignty is not about symbolic acts, flagship announcements, strategic moonshots, or building fabs in Merthyr Tydfil. It is not about the pursuit of some misplaced vision of self-sufficiency, but about ensuring that critical systems continue to function under conditions of contestation and disruption. It is a test of collective discipline and institutional competence, not of ambition or intent.