Very honest assessment. Thanks for this. It is useful to anybody taking up such roles. Which assumptions should we discard and which should we enforce (and make real firstly)?
Of course, any organisation, whether within a gov dept (or a national operation) or any university, you are battling a large culture of inertia, complacency (we didnt get here by being stategic) that is seeking to avoid creating any new precedents (which might bounce back on the individuals - a "framing problem" surely), of sloping shoulders, and of the various vested interests of the middle management, who are working at their own pace and think there is always another day. The 90-day thing, the "low hanging" fruit, etc, are probably vanity/ gimme effects, enabled by yes-men, given you are within such a culture. Better it is better to clear out (Thatcher's "Them or us") rather than be emasculated by all of the present practices and passive aggressive among your close servants.
But a clear strategy is for bad times as well as good times. When unforeseen events and privations occur it is something of a foothold to push back with. It does even need to be your "real strategy": it could just be the publicly stated strategy. Lol.
Actually, by R Rumelt's excellent definition ("Good Strategy, Bad Strategy", also at most airports), almost all universities (and public sector units) simply do not have any clear R&D (or other) strategy at all: there is no diagnosis, no policy and no actionable coherent actions to implement the policy within the diagnosis. Like the Prime Minister, they are too reactive rather than being proactive. Their strategies are just inclusive and obvious lists of toadying aims, and achievements, either already banked or obviously expected - with few explicit priorities, and far too much spreading out; while their HR strategies are supported by volunteer (activist?) interest groups (rather than the Supreme Court).
So, given that learning, how should things be done differently, next time, by you or by your successors?
First, I am a very big fan of 'Good Strategy, Bad Strategy'. It has greatly informed my approach, and I too recommend it highly. I think too much strategy in Government (& in HE) is 'bad strategy'. The two besetting issues are poor diagnosis and insufficient orientation to action. Many strategies in these settings are too broad and all-encompassing - without a clear 'North Star' and hence the actions are too diffuse. When this is combined with short funding horizons and a rapidly changing middle management tier it requires (and, to be fair, occasionally secures) heroic action to get big things done.
Anthony, appreciate the candour—refreshingly rare in these circles. My own 12-month government secondment taught me similar lessons, though arguably faster given its part-time nature. Having navigated university leadership at multiple levels, I've spotted a critical paradox.
Here's the rub: Management (whether Whitehall or HE) faces an inherent contradiction. Breakthroughs don't emerge from committees—they're forged by mavericks operating outside consensus. Yet scaling impact demands exactly what kills innovation: consensus-building, resource mobilisation, sphere expansion.
So here's my challenge: How do we optimise the conversion rate between individual brilliance and systemic change? What's your playbook for protecting the disruptors whilst building the coalitions?
My diagnosis—and growing concern—is that we've become intoxicated by "impact at scale" whilst systematically neutering the very individuals who spark transformation. We're building consensus machines without breakthrough engines. Without mechanisms to identify, protect, and amplify these "seeds of change," we're creating zombified institutions—perfectly coordinated in their irrelevance.
The strategic question isn't whether to choose between breakthrough or scale—it's how to architect systems that convert the former into the latter without killing the golden goose. Universities and government departments that crack this code will own the future. Those that don't will manage decline with exceptional consensus.
Your thoughts on the conversion mechanism? Because without it, we're just rearranging deckchairs with remarkable efficiency.
This is a very interesting question and one that, I expect, the innovation experts in our respective business schools might have a view on. I have two observations: (1) The use of alternative structures such as 'Engine B' in which you split the organisation between Engine A - core operations or legacy systems and Engine B - a new growth or innovation platform being developed alongside. Engine A keeps current systems running while Engine B explores new opportunities, technologies, or partnerships. Ideally Engine B then cannibalises Engine A or you can spin back into Engine A. (2) The systematic development of 'Intrapreneurs' who have the very particular combination of skills to maintain the consensus whilst at the same time working to disrupt it.
Good points. In Manchester, a Unit M has been created, which is what you call Engine B, I'd argue. https://www.unit-m.co.uk. Your second point is also something that I found valuable in our creation of one of my start-ups. One of my closest colleagues in Oxford advised me on the importance of nurturing the CEO of the company ahead of spinning out, particularly with an individual who had business acumen (which meant outside of my group at the time). I like your expression *systemmatic* because to make a difference, this cannot be a serendipitous one-off like in our case. Thanks for sharing your views., Hopefully, others will add to ours.
Completely agree - and not surprisingly it is also true of the software systems that we embed into the social world. Adaptation is crucial as the social, political and resource environment changes, and as the needs and objectives change.
Very honest assessment. Thanks for this. It is useful to anybody taking up such roles. Which assumptions should we discard and which should we enforce (and make real firstly)?
Of course, any organisation, whether within a gov dept (or a national operation) or any university, you are battling a large culture of inertia, complacency (we didnt get here by being stategic) that is seeking to avoid creating any new precedents (which might bounce back on the individuals - a "framing problem" surely), of sloping shoulders, and of the various vested interests of the middle management, who are working at their own pace and think there is always another day. The 90-day thing, the "low hanging" fruit, etc, are probably vanity/ gimme effects, enabled by yes-men, given you are within such a culture. Better it is better to clear out (Thatcher's "Them or us") rather than be emasculated by all of the present practices and passive aggressive among your close servants.
But a clear strategy is for bad times as well as good times. When unforeseen events and privations occur it is something of a foothold to push back with. It does even need to be your "real strategy": it could just be the publicly stated strategy. Lol.
Actually, by R Rumelt's excellent definition ("Good Strategy, Bad Strategy", also at most airports), almost all universities (and public sector units) simply do not have any clear R&D (or other) strategy at all: there is no diagnosis, no policy and no actionable coherent actions to implement the policy within the diagnosis. Like the Prime Minister, they are too reactive rather than being proactive. Their strategies are just inclusive and obvious lists of toadying aims, and achievements, either already banked or obviously expected - with few explicit priorities, and far too much spreading out; while their HR strategies are supported by volunteer (activist?) interest groups (rather than the Supreme Court).
So, given that learning, how should things be done differently, next time, by you or by your successors?
First, I am a very big fan of 'Good Strategy, Bad Strategy'. It has greatly informed my approach, and I too recommend it highly. I think too much strategy in Government (& in HE) is 'bad strategy'. The two besetting issues are poor diagnosis and insufficient orientation to action. Many strategies in these settings are too broad and all-encompassing - without a clear 'North Star' and hence the actions are too diffuse. When this is combined with short funding horizons and a rapidly changing middle management tier it requires (and, to be fair, occasionally secures) heroic action to get big things done.
Anthony, appreciate the candour—refreshingly rare in these circles. My own 12-month government secondment taught me similar lessons, though arguably faster given its part-time nature. Having navigated university leadership at multiple levels, I've spotted a critical paradox.
Here's the rub: Management (whether Whitehall or HE) faces an inherent contradiction. Breakthroughs don't emerge from committees—they're forged by mavericks operating outside consensus. Yet scaling impact demands exactly what kills innovation: consensus-building, resource mobilisation, sphere expansion.
So here's my challenge: How do we optimise the conversion rate between individual brilliance and systemic change? What's your playbook for protecting the disruptors whilst building the coalitions?
My diagnosis—and growing concern—is that we've become intoxicated by "impact at scale" whilst systematically neutering the very individuals who spark transformation. We're building consensus machines without breakthrough engines. Without mechanisms to identify, protect, and amplify these "seeds of change," we're creating zombified institutions—perfectly coordinated in their irrelevance.
The strategic question isn't whether to choose between breakthrough or scale—it's how to architect systems that convert the former into the latter without killing the golden goose. Universities and government departments that crack this code will own the future. Those that don't will manage decline with exceptional consensus.
Your thoughts on the conversion mechanism? Because without it, we're just rearranging deckchairs with remarkable efficiency.
This is a very interesting question and one that, I expect, the innovation experts in our respective business schools might have a view on. I have two observations: (1) The use of alternative structures such as 'Engine B' in which you split the organisation between Engine A - core operations or legacy systems and Engine B - a new growth or innovation platform being developed alongside. Engine A keeps current systems running while Engine B explores new opportunities, technologies, or partnerships. Ideally Engine B then cannibalises Engine A or you can spin back into Engine A. (2) The systematic development of 'Intrapreneurs' who have the very particular combination of skills to maintain the consensus whilst at the same time working to disrupt it.
Good points. In Manchester, a Unit M has been created, which is what you call Engine B, I'd argue. https://www.unit-m.co.uk. Your second point is also something that I found valuable in our creation of one of my start-ups. One of my closest colleagues in Oxford advised me on the importance of nurturing the CEO of the company ahead of spinning out, particularly with an individual who had business acumen (which meant outside of my group at the time). I like your expression *systemmatic* because to make a difference, this cannot be a serendipitous one-off like in our case. Thanks for sharing your views., Hopefully, others will add to ours.
Completely agree - and not surprisingly it is also true of the software systems that we embed into the social world. Adaptation is crucial as the social, political and resource environment changes, and as the needs and objectives change.
You might have added two words to your last sentence: "by definition"! Interesting piece, as usual.