One episode that is worth rescuing from 2010-2024 is the BN(O) visa scheme: by no means a fully-fledged China policy, but a flair of what one may hope to achieve.
Dominic Raab's surprise announcement in July 2020 that up to three million Hong Kongers with British National (Overseas) passports would be allowed to come and settle in the UK came after months of urging Beijing not to implement a draconian national security law that fundamentally violated the commitments to preserve the Hong Kong way of life under "one country, two systems."
It was a genuine cross-government response, involving the Home Office (visas) and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (small community-based grants to aid integration) to help the integration of newcomers. Raab mentioned that it took "a huge amount of work since September last year [2019]": i.e., over 10 months of preparation on a mere contingency plan!
It was a public opinion success, with the BN(O) visa scheme largely managing to stay out of the crossfire of the immigration debate; insofar as it featured, it received wholehearted, cross-party support.
It was an economic win, thanks to the fact that the average Hong Konger is wealthier than the average UK citizen.
It was, arguably, a national security win: because BN(O) passport holders under the scheme were allowed to work in the civil service from day one, they expanded the pool of talent available to the UK government to understand and deal with China (not just as Cantonese/Mandarin speakers, but as people whose values and political motivations were aligned with the defence of democratic values).
It was also a textbook example of deterrence by punishment: the UK set a red line, communicated it publicly and privately, and then followed through with the imposition of costs when the red line was crossed. The genius of the response was the ability to identify an area with asymmetrical costs, allowing a smaller country acting unilaterally not only to stand up to China, but to strengthen its moral, economic, and security standing in the process.
The issue is: how difficult is it to replicate such strategic surprises? The MOD talks about the need to "create doubt and dilemmas for adversaries and ... maintain escalation dominance," but I cannot think of many examples of cross-government work of the same magnitude and impact as the BN(O) visa scheme. (I got a bit of solace from what the DNSA said recently in a JCNSS hearing: "While the fusion doctrine does not live in the same way, the intent does.")
In my field of research and policy (addressing antimicrobial resistance) China is emerging as a front runner in diagnostic capability and capacity - the African continent in particular is/will benefit.
This is an excellent example of the tensions we must address, because of course, China's engagement in Africa carries with it adverse political and geopolitical consequences.
An excellent analysis Anthony. Specifically, a one party system does not directly imply despotism any more than democracy ( as we can now see) implies rational and evidence based leadership. In fact China’s progress over recent years has largely been due to its rational planning system while the US decline has been based largely on the inertia imposed by its balance of powers coupled with an ideological belief in market forces. I would not be prepared to bet on human rights in either jurisdiction.
I'm afraid I don't follow. China's is a despotic regime and I don't see inertia in the US (though I don't agree with the current direction of travel). I also fear that the balance of powers in the US is being eroded, which is not because of an ideological belief in market forces but Trump's own ideology (which tends to despotism). I am all for rational and evidence-based planning and leadership, but one I can disagree with.
One episode that is worth rescuing from 2010-2024 is the BN(O) visa scheme: by no means a fully-fledged China policy, but a flair of what one may hope to achieve.
Dominic Raab's surprise announcement in July 2020 that up to three million Hong Kongers with British National (Overseas) passports would be allowed to come and settle in the UK came after months of urging Beijing not to implement a draconian national security law that fundamentally violated the commitments to preserve the Hong Kong way of life under "one country, two systems."
It was a genuine cross-government response, involving the Home Office (visas) and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (small community-based grants to aid integration) to help the integration of newcomers. Raab mentioned that it took "a huge amount of work since September last year [2019]": i.e., over 10 months of preparation on a mere contingency plan!
It was a public opinion success, with the BN(O) visa scheme largely managing to stay out of the crossfire of the immigration debate; insofar as it featured, it received wholehearted, cross-party support.
It was an economic win, thanks to the fact that the average Hong Konger is wealthier than the average UK citizen.
It was, arguably, a national security win: because BN(O) passport holders under the scheme were allowed to work in the civil service from day one, they expanded the pool of talent available to the UK government to understand and deal with China (not just as Cantonese/Mandarin speakers, but as people whose values and political motivations were aligned with the defence of democratic values).
It was also a textbook example of deterrence by punishment: the UK set a red line, communicated it publicly and privately, and then followed through with the imposition of costs when the red line was crossed. The genius of the response was the ability to identify an area with asymmetrical costs, allowing a smaller country acting unilaterally not only to stand up to China, but to strengthen its moral, economic, and security standing in the process.
The issue is: how difficult is it to replicate such strategic surprises? The MOD talks about the need to "create doubt and dilemmas for adversaries and ... maintain escalation dominance," but I cannot think of many examples of cross-government work of the same magnitude and impact as the BN(O) visa scheme. (I got a bit of solace from what the DNSA said recently in a JCNSS hearing: "While the fusion doctrine does not live in the same way, the intent does.")
What an interesting comment! Thank you.
In the world of Global Health we work with China.
In my field of research and policy (addressing antimicrobial resistance) China is emerging as a front runner in diagnostic capability and capacity - the African continent in particular is/will benefit.
Scale is unparalleled.
Would like to learn more from China.
This is an excellent example of the tensions we must address, because of course, China's engagement in Africa carries with it adverse political and geopolitical consequences.
An excellent analysis Anthony. Specifically, a one party system does not directly imply despotism any more than democracy ( as we can now see) implies rational and evidence based leadership. In fact China’s progress over recent years has largely been due to its rational planning system while the US decline has been based largely on the inertia imposed by its balance of powers coupled with an ideological belief in market forces. I would not be prepared to bet on human rights in either jurisdiction.
I'm afraid I don't follow. China's is a despotic regime and I don't see inertia in the US (though I don't agree with the current direction of travel). I also fear that the balance of powers in the US is being eroded, which is not because of an ideological belief in market forces but Trump's own ideology (which tends to despotism). I am all for rational and evidence-based planning and leadership, but one I can disagree with.