A Simple Guide to National Security Strategy

… for scientists and technologists

Science & Technology (S&T) are increasingly at the centre of geopolitics. They are a key domain of adversarial contest. They are a critical element of economic security and a vital underpinning of societal well-being, shaping national resilience. At a moment when military tension and active conflict are rising globally, the role of S&T is pivotal in enhancing defence capabilities. S&T does not merely support national security but increasingly determines it.

These are not abstract policy considerations. The consequences are manifest in laboratories, universities, and tech organisations both large and small. There are associated risks for scientists and technologists, in relation to funding, collaboration, and regulation. It is for these reasons scientists and technologists need to understand national security strategy and what it means for them. To do this does not require you to become an expert in foreign affairs. I will attempt a simple distillation focussed on S&T specifically.

This brief guide is principally motivated by the publication in December 2025 (though dated November) of the ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, which has received widespread attention. This attention has principally focussed on the evident ideological and political framing. The strategy departs in style, clear and forceful, and approach from previous strategies. It also differs in substance. It shifts away from the previous policy consensus on global leadership and democratic norms, towards an emphasis on US national interests and a focus on sovereignty. This has broad implications for the geopolitical order. There is plenty of commentary on this if you are interested. Much of it is lengthy, some of it is heated, and not all of it is illuminating. I simply note it here, but will concentrate on what it means for S&T.

I think that, important though it is, viewing the US National Security Strategy on its own would be an error. I will therefore make comparison to the ‘UK National Security Strategy 2025: security for the British people in a dangerous world’, published in June 2025. I will also compare and contrast with ‘2025 China’s National Security in the New Era’ a White Paper published by the Information Office of the State Council of the PRC in May 2025 and made available in translation by the China Aerospace Studies Institute of the US Air University. These 3 documents, taken together, capture the dominant strategic models currently shaping global S&T. Clearly, this is short of a full analysis.

TLDR: The US National Security Strategy positions S&T not as a policy area but as the core engine of national power. Technological primacy is, in this context, synonymous with American sovereignty and strategic advantage.

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Here are the key points:

Maintaining scientific and technological preeminence. The US intends to reinforce a position as the most scientifically and technologically advanced and innovative country in the world. It links S&T directly to prosperity and military superiority. It identifies an American ‘pioneering spirit’ as a key pillar of economic and defence strength. It will protect intellectual property from foreign theft and invest in basic science and emerging technologies.

The UK National Security Strategy aligns with this logic but adopts a more explicitly defensive and resilience-oriented framing. Rather than global preeminence, the UK emphasises the identification, protection, and nurturing of sovereign scientific and technological capabilities sufficient to sustain national security, economic growth, and alliance commitments. China, by contrast, frames scientific and technological preeminence as inseparable from national rejuvenation. Its strategy emphasises self-reliance, system-wide mobilisation, and the reduction of dependence on foreign technologies, presenting S&T leadership as both a civilisational and ideological imperative rather than simply a competitive advantage. The UK position is structurally dependent on alliances, whereas the US and China strategies are more explicitly standalone.

Identifying critical strategic technologies. The strategy sets out a small number of technologies as areas where the US must not only achieve dominance but also must define global standards. Specifically, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, and quantum computing.

The UK broadly identifies the same technological domains but places greater emphasis on safe adoption, regulation, and risk management alongside capability development, particularly in AI and biotechnology. China similarly prioritises AI, quantum, and biotechnology, but frames them within a long-term state-led planning model in which standard-setting, industrial scaling, and military integration proceed in parallel, with less distinction between civil and defence applications. The US emphasis is on leadership and control of standards, the UK on stewardship and safety, and China on scale and integration.

S&T as an instrument of economic security. Economic security is directly tied to national security, with S&T at the core. This entails building domestic capability in critical and emerging technologies through a programme of reindustrialisation underpinned by a tariff-enabled industrial strategy to reshore advanced manufacturing. It envisages reviving the defence industrial base, with a push for low-cost innovation in areas such as counter-drone capabilities and advanced munitions. These aims require secure supply chains, particularly for critical minerals, electronics, and defence materials.

The UK strategy mirrors the linkage between economic and national security but operates within tighter financial and industrial constraints. It focuses on rebuilding the defence industrial base, securing supply chains, and translating defence investment into domestic jobs and skills, rather than on large-scale tariff-led reindustrialisation. China goes further still, treating economic security, industrial policy, and technological development as a single integrated system, with extensive state direction to ensure control over supply chains, critical minerals, and strategic manufacturing capacity. China’s approach largely eschews the tension between economic efficiency and security resilience, a distinction that remains present in both US and UK strategies.

Technology protection and countering adversaries. The strategy identifies multiple S&T-linked threats, particularly from China, including: intellectual property theft and industrial espionage, predatory technology transfer, exploitation of supply-chain vulnerabilities, and exports of materials enabling production of synthetic opioids. These threats are to be countered by export controls and associated restrictions on technology transfer, in combination with alignment of standards and controls with allies.

The UK adopts a more calibrated approach, emphasising research security, investment screening, and risk mitigation within universities and industry, while seeking to remain open to international collaboration where risks can be managed. China rejects this framing entirely, characterising export controls and technology restrictions as tools of containment, and positions its own technology protection measures as defensive responses necessary to safeguard national sovereignty and development. Universities are treated as frontline actors in the UK strategy, whereas they are framed primarily as assets to be protected or controlled in the US and China strategies respectively.

Leveraging the private sector for national security. Particular emphasis is placed on public-private cooperation and an explicit alignment of private-sector innovation with national power. It sees continuous collaboration with the US technology sector as a principal means to detect and counter cyber threats. Embassies and US government agencies are to be instructed to support US firms in technology-related markets.

The UK similarly emphasises public–private partnership but places greater stress on coordination, resilience, and shared responsibility rather than explicit alignment with national power. China’s approach differs markedly, treating the private technology sector as an extension of the state security system, with formal obligations to support national security objectives and far less separation between commercial innovation and state strategy. The UK and US models assume consent and partnership, whereas the Chinese model relies on obligation and direction.

Technology in the military balance. The strategy positions technological superiority centrally in a ‘peace through strength’ approach. It emphasises superiority in space and undersea domains. It anticipates significant investment in autonomous systems, nuclear, undersea and space technologies, and energy technologies that power advanced military capabilities. The strategy notes the importance of missile defence particularly in relation to the US homeland.

The UK shares the emphasis on advanced military technologies but focuses on achieving asymmetric advantage within NATO and allied frameworks rather than unilateral dominance. China places similar weight on emerging military technologies, particularly AI-enabled systems, space, and undersea capabilities, but frames them within a doctrine of integrated civil–military development intended to narrow or offset perceived US advantages. Deterrence is the organising concept for all 3 strategies, but the means of achieving it differ substantially. Agreement on the objective does not, in this case, translate into agreement on the method.

Standards and Influence. The US is competing with China in global infrastructure, digital systems, and technology ecosystems. It intends that it is US technology and standards that will dominate. It will use superior US technology as the attractor in global partnerships and will export key US civil and defence technologies to Gulf and Indo-Pacific partners in a manner consistent with this strategy.

The UK seeks influence primarily through alliance-based standard-setting and regulatory leadership, particularly in areas such as AI safety and digital governance. China places heavy emphasis on shaping international standards through multilateral bodies and bilateral infrastructure partnerships, viewing standards-setting as a long-term mechanism for embedding its technologies and governance models globally. Standards-setting is treated as a strategic battleground rather than a technical exercise in all 3 strategies.

Energy technologies as strategic assets. Energy technology is framed as both economic and national security infrastructure. Energy dominance across oil, gas, coal, and nuclear is required to maintain technological advantage. Nuclear technology is explicitly mentioned as an export and strategic capability. Energy abundance is linked to supporting high-intensity, tech-driven industries.

The UK adopts a contrasting emphasis, linking energy security to decarbonisation, clean power, and nuclear resilience rather than hydrocarbon dominance. China treats energy technologies as foundational to national security, pursuing parallel investments in renewables, nuclear, and fossil fuels to maximise autonomy, scale, and industrial advantage. Clearly this is less about positions on climate change, though these are evident, and more about enabling computational and industrial intensity.

S&T as a soft(ish) power tool in the ‘Global South’. The strategy sets out how US high-tech cooperation, capital markets access, and access to infrastructure technologies can be used as an alternative to Chinese influence. It aims to use US S&T strengths to attract partners in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

The UK adopts a more partnership-oriented approach, emphasising capacity building, research collaboration, and regulatory cooperation. China places this agenda at the centre of its international strategy, using infrastructure, digital systems, and technology transfer as instruments of long-term influence and strategic alignment across the Global South. This is an area where scientists and technologists are most likely to encounter national security strategy immediately and in practice … often before anyone has had time to explain that this is what is happening.

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Taken together, these strategies make clear that S&T are no longer adjacent to national security but central to it. For scientists and technologists, this has concrete implications. Choices about research direction, collaboration, data, infrastructure, and commercialisation are increasingly shaped by strategic considerations that sit well beyond the lab or the organisation. Understanding national security strategy is therefore not about adopting a particular political position. It is instead about recognising the environment in which S&T now operate, and the responsibilities, constraints, and opportunities that flow from that reality.