We indeed need to respect our colleagues who do not want to work on 'Defense' and we also need to respect that DoD/MoD may not want to work with of our colleagues (for instance, due to their nationality). I fully agree with the fact that in European countries we should work more on sustainable capabilities and capacities for our society's safety and security, including for our overseas territories. And this should be done in a context of sovereignty and open strategic autonomy where our European industries should be engaged in the take-up and scale-up of these capabilities and capacities to transform these in operational capabilities and capacities not only to the benefits for our military and our law enforcement, but for our society at large.
I fully agree with the text. In fact, I already did what was suggested since from 2003 to 2009, I was Science and Technology Chair of the Defense Technology Centre on Data and Information Fusion, working with General Dynamics UK Ltd at Imperial College. I also was Co-PI on the BAE co-funded EPSRC Aladdin project. These types of large industry-university defence projects seem to have stopped, unfortunately, around the years 2010-2012. Erol Gelenbe
In times of existential threats, such as WWII, the UK has always accelerated scientific innovation, from discovery though to advantage. Of course, D&S needs an ability (which it does not have) to accept that and partially to get out of requirements-led activity. And to break out of consensus thinking (of risk-averse middle management). Actually, UKRI desperately needs that too.
Perhaps 20% of the D&S innovation programmes should be without any problem specifications (never mind currently identified requirements and internal stakeholders ~ "threads"). This would align it better with lateral thinking, and be far more open to our most creative minds. We would not have our upsides top-sliced by vertical thinking, and we could thrill our allies with game-changing innovations.
On the other hand, it is almost comedic that the present existential threats to our nation and our way of life are so little discussed within academic departments (and in society, in general). Scientists often abhor (any) strategy, preferring long-term (career building) challenges: they prioritise their discussions about the distribution of meagre funding for fellowships, PhDs, community-building, and resources.
Agreed -- What is lacking is both the 20% you mention, which should in an open responsive mode, and the incredible lack of discussion in academia of research that can help us fend off the real existential threats to our way of life.
The US Positions on Venezuela and Greenland are a threat because of the way the executive their weaponise things like tarrifs to create incentives for other soverign states to align. In the latter case, it is a clear and present danger for NATO. That is not to be lightly dismissed at all. It also creates a clear pathway for China to take over Taiwan, by taking the moral low ground on sovereignty and reducing the West's position to differing little from (say) Putin's. This changes all defence discussions since we need to consider the UK's capability on its own. Not to undermine your argument for more investment, but to consider how we can no longer depend on historical treaties or friendships. As discussed previously, the actual nature of weaponry (whether economic or cyber which may not be so different anyhow these days) also means our dependence on foreign, not always supportive technology platform owners is strongly counter-indicated.
OK. Let us set aside what exactly is, and is not, a ‘threat’. And set aside too the limited intended scope of this article. Finally, let us hold over the issue of Venezuela and Taiwan, well analysed by Charlie Parton https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/a-tale-of-two-justice-missions . I agree that the US pivot in terms of security means that we can rely less upon the institutions of collective security. But … it is also true we cannot achieve complete technological sovereignty given the need to address a very complex operational environment (see my outline of the ‘Serious Doctrine’). We need a sober appraisal of the US motivations and interests. I now intend to write something on sovereignty. Watch this space.
this is an important topic- look forward to your thoughts - we (as academics in a very global community but with very local educational and research duties) have to understand the nature of sovereignty today! Its come up in research funding discussions quite a bit (just as much outside of the defense context).....
Interestingly, other than technical evaluations that indicated that our projects had been successful and some patents and intellectual property that we also delivered to industry, I did not receive any thank you or sign of having done a good job, or of having been useful to the country.
Doesn't seem to grasp the depth of our security crisis. Whatever threats may be incoming from identified adversaries abroad are dwarfed in depth and extent by our vulnerabilites in relation to a long presumed ally across the Atlantic. The threats posed from there are at least becoming more visible, but our existing security arrangements are so deeply compromised it's hard to see on what bases our security could be recomposed. That's the sort of challenge one expects you could help with.
It is clear that a changed policy and posture on the part of the US changes how we might develop our own capabilities and our approach to sovereign technology, but I am disinclined to emphasise this. I am certainly not accepting of what I judge to be some over heated views expressed elsewhere. Whilst it is evident that US policy discourse has changed, it is unclear what in practice will change in our partnering arrangements. I did provide an analysis in my blog on national security strategy (and in associated articles). I will however consider how I should address this issue. Thank you for your comment.
OK. But to be clear, the article presents an argument about universities and defence engagement. It is not, and was not intended as, a broader UK security review. I have of course looked at this issue in other things I have written.
US is -not- a threat but the change in their security policy and posture is an important contextual factor. Probably underlining a more thoughtful approach to sovereign capability.
In times of peace, their propaganda is to milk the defence budget. Then, when troubled times come round, we have too little too late.
A well maintained defence industry is cheap insurance.
We indeed need to respect our colleagues who do not want to work on 'Defense' and we also need to respect that DoD/MoD may not want to work with of our colleagues (for instance, due to their nationality). I fully agree with the fact that in European countries we should work more on sustainable capabilities and capacities for our society's safety and security, including for our overseas territories. And this should be done in a context of sovereignty and open strategic autonomy where our European industries should be engaged in the take-up and scale-up of these capabilities and capacities to transform these in operational capabilities and capacities not only to the benefits for our military and our law enforcement, but for our society at large.
I fully agree with the text. In fact, I already did what was suggested since from 2003 to 2009, I was Science and Technology Chair of the Defense Technology Centre on Data and Information Fusion, working with General Dynamics UK Ltd at Imperial College. I also was Co-PI on the BAE co-funded EPSRC Aladdin project. These types of large industry-university defence projects seem to have stopped, unfortunately, around the years 2010-2012. Erol Gelenbe
In times of existential threats, such as WWII, the UK has always accelerated scientific innovation, from discovery though to advantage. Of course, D&S needs an ability (which it does not have) to accept that and partially to get out of requirements-led activity. And to break out of consensus thinking (of risk-averse middle management). Actually, UKRI desperately needs that too.
Perhaps 20% of the D&S innovation programmes should be without any problem specifications (never mind currently identified requirements and internal stakeholders ~ "threads"). This would align it better with lateral thinking, and be far more open to our most creative minds. We would not have our upsides top-sliced by vertical thinking, and we could thrill our allies with game-changing innovations.
On the other hand, it is almost comedic that the present existential threats to our nation and our way of life are so little discussed within academic departments (and in society, in general). Scientists often abhor (any) strategy, preferring long-term (career building) challenges: they prioritise their discussions about the distribution of meagre funding for fellowships, PhDs, community-building, and resources.
Agreed -- What is lacking is both the 20% you mention, which should in an open responsive mode, and the incredible lack of discussion in academia of research that can help us fend off the real existential threats to our way of life.
The US Positions on Venezuela and Greenland are a threat because of the way the executive their weaponise things like tarrifs to create incentives for other soverign states to align. In the latter case, it is a clear and present danger for NATO. That is not to be lightly dismissed at all. It also creates a clear pathway for China to take over Taiwan, by taking the moral low ground on sovereignty and reducing the West's position to differing little from (say) Putin's. This changes all defence discussions since we need to consider the UK's capability on its own. Not to undermine your argument for more investment, but to consider how we can no longer depend on historical treaties or friendships. As discussed previously, the actual nature of weaponry (whether economic or cyber which may not be so different anyhow these days) also means our dependence on foreign, not always supportive technology platform owners is strongly counter-indicated.
OK. Let us set aside what exactly is, and is not, a ‘threat’. And set aside too the limited intended scope of this article. Finally, let us hold over the issue of Venezuela and Taiwan, well analysed by Charlie Parton https://www.observingchina.org.uk/p/a-tale-of-two-justice-missions . I agree that the US pivot in terms of security means that we can rely less upon the institutions of collective security. But … it is also true we cannot achieve complete technological sovereignty given the need to address a very complex operational environment (see my outline of the ‘Serious Doctrine’). We need a sober appraisal of the US motivations and interests. I now intend to write something on sovereignty. Watch this space.
this is an important topic- look forward to your thoughts - we (as academics in a very global community but with very local educational and research duties) have to understand the nature of sovereignty today! Its come up in research funding discussions quite a bit (just as much outside of the defense context).....
Correct in every particular. Jenni Russell's article in today's Times (https://www.thetimes.com/comment/columnists/article/its-time-for-starmer-to-exercise-his-power-hczsrn7k3?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqcC40kl3zluPdeCfpN2zpo2Q_3TMq0ZIidtobX2-9tukKfO91W8WdygaV_IfSs%3D&gaa_ts=696501de&gaa_sig=HPW5gkDhqOBXfJWp1qj9IpMW3EyvcR_ubjMA4t5otIkyKL3JrRfTq-bQBT3oEb3a5oiCIv0Umz9gx6RNBZQOVQ%3D%3D) may be a sign that opinion across a broad range of political persuasions is starting to come around to the realistic position you advance.
Very well said.
Interestingly, other than technical evaluations that indicated that our projects had been successful and some patents and intellectual property that we also delivered to industry, I did not receive any thank you or sign of having done a good job, or of having been useful to the country.
Doesn't seem to grasp the depth of our security crisis. Whatever threats may be incoming from identified adversaries abroad are dwarfed in depth and extent by our vulnerabilites in relation to a long presumed ally across the Atlantic. The threats posed from there are at least becoming more visible, but our existing security arrangements are so deeply compromised it's hard to see on what bases our security could be recomposed. That's the sort of challenge one expects you could help with.
It is clear that a changed policy and posture on the part of the US changes how we might develop our own capabilities and our approach to sovereign technology, but I am disinclined to emphasise this. I am certainly not accepting of what I judge to be some over heated views expressed elsewhere. Whilst it is evident that US policy discourse has changed, it is unclear what in practice will change in our partnering arrangements. I did provide an analysis in my blog on national security strategy (and in associated articles). I will however consider how I should address this issue. Thank you for your comment.
I think you need to reassess the consequence
OK. But to be clear, the article presents an argument about universities and defence engagement. It is not, and was not intended as, a broader UK security review. I have of course looked at this issue in other things I have written.
No mention of the USA in the threats ? Really ?
US is -not- a threat but the change in their security policy and posture is an important contextual factor. Probably underlining a more thoughtful approach to sovereign capability.